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New Federal and Provincial Personal Information
Protection Legislation and its Impact on Physicians and
Public Hospitals
Evguenia Prokopieva†

Interaction between Federal and
Provincial Personal Information
Protection Legislation and Standards
Existing in Other Sources

Introduction

P

rotection of personal information has become one
of the most debatable issues in legal literature. Rapidly developing technologies make it increasingly easy to
combine publicly available personal data from various
sources and use that information equally for beneficial or
detrimental purposes. Along with technological changes,
the enactment of the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 1 and
provincial personal data protection legislation 2 has also
contributed to these debates.
Maintaining control over one’s personal health
information in particular has been hotly disputed, due to
the inherent sensitivity of our medical records. 3 Many
would argue that because of the nature of personal
health information, its protection is fundamental to the
health care system and should be the default option as
opposed to public disclosure or disclosure to those who
are not the subject. 4
The focus of this article is to examine the implications of the new federal and Ontario personal data protection legislation for physicians and public hospitals.
This article also inquires into whether the new legislation will contribute to the protection of patient privacy.
By ‘‘physician’’ I mean a doctor in a broad sense – i.e., ‘‘a
person who has been educated, trained, and licensed to
practice the art and science of medicine’’. 5 This will
include family doctors, pediatricians, psychiatrists, surgeons, and other medical doctors covered by the Regulated Health Professions Act. 6 By the term ‘‘public hospitals’’ I will refer to not-for-profit hospitals as they are
defined by the Public Hospitals Act. 7
The first part of the article will examine the interrelationship between the personal data protection legislation and existing standards for physicians. The second
part will analyze PIPEDA and its implications for doctors
and public hospitals. Lastly, I will analyze the new
Ontario legislation designed to protect personal information in the context of health care and treatment.

PIPEDA was enacted in 2000. Since January 1, 2004,
it has been in full force and effect. A number of provinces have enacted their own personal data protection
legislation, whether general or sectoral. Ontario is one of
the provinces that has concentrated on protection of
personal health information. The new Ontario Personal
Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) 8 came into
force on November 1, 2004.
Before embarking on a discussion about implications of PIPEDA and PHIPA for doctors and public hospitals, I will explore a more basic issue. Is there even a
need for new legislation protecting personal health information? What is the relationship between the federal
and provincial personal information protection legislation, on one hand, and standards for health care professionals set out by common law and specialized provincial statutes such as the Health Care Consent Act, 9 and
professional codes such as the Canadian Medical Association’s Code of Ethics, 10 on the other hand?
One may argue that standards set by common law,
provincial statutes, and professional codes for physicians
are so high that the adherence to those standards will
automatically lead to compliance with the requirements
of the new personal information protection legislation,
and both PIPEDA and PHIPA represent an attempt to
impose on public hospitals and physicians redundant
obligations amounting to an unnecessary paperwork.
Indeed, some health care representatives take the view
that
. . . the application of PIPEDA in the medical system will
introduce significant impediments to the delivery of health
care services, while providing virtually no substantive
improvements to patient confidentiality over existing laws.
. . . [T]he medical profession in Ontario is bound by a clear
and concise set of rules with respect to patient confidentiality, as found in the Medicine Act, the Health Care Consent
Act, and augmented by the CMA Code of Ethics. 11
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The argument, however, does not stand. First, the
existing common-law standards of care and rules of professional conduct for medical practitioners are not
designed to protect personal health information. Rather,
they play the role of ensuring a relationship of trust
between doctors and their patients and set rules of professional conduct. The confidentiality of information disclosed in the course of diagnoses and treatment is certainly a significant part of both trust relationships
between doctors and their patients and rules of professional conduct. Protection of individuals’ confidentiality
and privacy is also a purpose of the new legislation. The
new legislation, however, has other objectives which
cannot be achieved by the existing standards. For
example, PHIPA purports not only to protect the confidentiality of personal health information and the privacy
of individuals with respect to that information, but also
to provide individuals with a right of access to their
personal health information and a right to require the
correction or amendment of that information. 12 Thus,
not only is the new personal data protection legislation
designed to guard personal health information, but it
also provides for protection of a broader spectrum of
interests.
Second, the existing common-law standards of care
and rules of professional conduct apply only to immediate health care providers (i.e., to physicians in the
course of treatment of their patients). PHIPA, by contrast,
applies to a wide range of entities, called health information custodians, which include not only physicians and
other health care providers, but also all kinds of health
care facilities, medical officers, pharmacies, and laboratories. In certain situations, the new Act applies to persons
other than health information custodians. This ensures
that personal health information is protected during
‘‘secondary uses’’ as well. In other words, the individual’s
privacy is protected not only within the trust relationship between him and his doctor, but also outside this
relationship. This is true in relation to PIPEDA as well.
Technological advances and the specificities of the
health care system make it necessary that dozens of
people other than physicians (receptionists, lab technicians, etc.) have access to personal health information.
The nature and extent of these persons’ duties are not
clear. Further, due to computerization of records, it is not
always obvious who ‘‘holds’’ information and is, therefore, responsible for its protection. 13 The new legislation
tries to eliminate these difficulties. Both PHIPA and
PIPEDA are broader than the existing standards of protection in their application. They not only codify rules
found in common law and codes of professional conduct for physicians, but introduce new concepts and
extend the requirements to supporting staff and other
persons handling records of personal health information.
In this respect, both pieces of legislation are a product of
the evolving Canadian law accommodating the interests
of individuals in today’s technological environment.
Both acts are designed to respond ‘‘to concerns raised by
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the incomplete protection provided by the common law
and intensified by technological developments’’. 14 It is
believed, therefore, that the new legislation will prevent
situations such as where a patient’s records forwarded to
her treating physician by a laboratory show up on the
back of flyers distributed in Toronto for a real estate
company. 15
Third, even if certain obligations under the new
legislation appear to reiterate corresponding obligations
under provincial health care-related statutes, common
law, and rules of professional conduct, this appearance is
in fact deceptive. Take, for example, the obligation to
obtain consent. It is true that, under the existing standards, consent is central to the whole system of treatment. The right to decide whether a medical intervention will be accepted is an extension of one’s
fundamental right to bodily integrity and the concept of
individual autonomy in general. 16 In Ontario, the
common-law rules on consent to treatment were codified by the Health Care Consent Act. 17 However, consent to treatment by itself is by no means sufficient for
the purposes of protecting personal health information.
Under both PIPEDA and the new Ontario Act, the
requirements of consent are broader. They cover not
only consent to treatment itself but also consent to collect, use and disclose information provided by the
patient for the purposes of treatment. This, again, demonstrates that the new legislation accords broader protection to individuals’ privacy. 18
It may well be, nevertheless, that physicians and
public hospitals will use a single consent form to obtain
consent to treatment and consent to the collection, use
and/or disclosure of personal health information for the
purposes of that treatment. The wording of such a form
should be precise so that the patient is not confused.
Theoretically, it is possible that the patient will give consent to treatment but refuses to give consent with respect
to personal health information. In practice, however, this
may mean that treatment will be impossible, for adequate treatment is premised on a full and free exchange
of information between doctors and patients.
Fourth, the new personal data protection legislation
equips patients with more ways of enforcing their rights.
Failure to obtain a valid consent to treatment will result
in a health care professional’s liability for administering
treatment without consent 19 and may lead to an action
in battery. 20 If consent was obtained but the requirement
of adequate information is not met (i.e., consent was not
informed), the patient may commence an action in negligence. 21 The common-law actions may not always be
effective because they are expensive and lengthy, or
simply because the patient cannot satisfy all required
elements of actions. Failure to obtain consent may also
lead to a finding of professional misconduct on the part
of a physician. Thus, ‘‘[p]erforming a professional service
for which consent is required by law without consent’’
and ‘‘[g]iving information concerning the condition of a
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patient or any services rendered to a patient to a person
other than the patient or his or her authorized representative except with the consent of the patient or his or her
authorized representative or as required by law’’ constitute acts of professional misconduct 22 for the purposes of
the Health Professions Procedural Code 23 and may result
in disciplinary actions against the physician. 24 However,
these provisions do not capture situations of unauthorized collection, use, or disclosure of personal health
information as they arise in the context of personal data
protection in the era of new technological developments.
Rather, they are intended to cover cases of administering
treatment without consent and divulging information
about a patient’s condition and treatment to persons
other than the patient (e.g., spouses, children, etc.).
On the other hand, under PIPEDA or PHIPA, failure
to obtain a valid consent to collect, use or disclose one’s
personal health information will lead to a health information custodian’s liability for the collection, use or disclosure of an individual’s information without consent.
Certainly, neither PIPEDA nor PHIPA protects patients
from physicians’ professional malpractice. Both Acts,
however, broaden remedies available to the patients in
situations of misuse of their personal health information.
In cases where the common law or disciplinary actions
are ineffective, the patients may well rely on provisions of
the new legislation. Moreover, according to PHIPA, if the
Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner makes
an order under this Act, or if a person is convicted of an
offence under this Act, an individual affected by the
order or conduct that gave rise to the offence may commence a proceeding in the Superior Court of Justice for
damages for actual harm that this individual has suffered
as a result of a contravention of the requirements of
PHIPA. 25
Finally, PHIPA contains various provisions specifying changes and amendments that should be made to
other provincial statutes. It is further provided that in the
event of a conflict between a provision of PHIPA or its
regulations and a provision of any other Act or its regulations, PHIPA and its regulations will prevail. 26 The new
Act will not take priority only if it is specifically provided
for. This suggests that it is the intention of the drafters
that the new Ontario Act and other relevant statutes be
consistent with each other and operate together, regulating different aspects of the health care practitioners’
and hospitals’ activities with respect to the collection, use
and disclosure of personal health information so as to
ensure a better protection of patient privacy.
Therefore, it is submitted that the new legislative
regime is not redundant. Rather, it is designed to both
further and enhance protection of patient privacy in the
modern technological environment. In the next section,
I will describe how physicians and public hospitals are
influenced by PIPEDA and PHIPA.

PIPEDA and its Potential Impact on
Physicians and Public Hospitals
Applicability of PIPEDA in General
It is more than a year since PIPEDA has been in its
full force and effect. This means that the federal regime
for the protection of personal information in the private
sector now applies to all works, undertakings and businesses, whether federal or provincial, with respect to collection, use, and disclosure of personal information in
the course of commercial activities. 27
The application of PIPEDA to organizations
engaged in commercial activities depends on whether
the latter involve inter- or intra-provincial dealings. In
case of inter-provincial dealings, the Act applies irrespective of the presence or absence of an analogous provincial scheme, whereas in case of intra-provincial dealings,
the Act applies unless the existing counterpart provincial
personal data protection law (whether general or
sectoral) meets the ‘‘substantially similar’’ test. 28

‘‘Substantially Similar’’ Test
A provincial personal data protection law is deemed
to be ‘‘substantially similar’’ to PIPEDA if it is ‘‘equal or
superior to’’ the latter in the degree of quality of personal
information protection offered. 29 If such is the case, the
Governor in Council will issue an Order in Council
exempting an organization, an activity or a class of organizations or activities from compliance with the requirements of PIPEDA to the extent that the latter applies
within the provincial boundaries. 30
The criteria established by the Minister of Industry,
through which the federal government will determine if
the ‘‘substantially similar’’ test is met, set out certain
requirements for provincial legislation. ‘‘Substantially
similar’’ provincial/territorial legislation will be expected
to:
— incorporate the ten principles in Schedule 1
(Section 5) of the PIPEDA, Principles set out in
the National Standard of Canada entitled Model
Code for the Protection of Personal Information
. . . The principles are accountability, identifying
purposes, consent, limiting collection, limiting
use, disclosure, and retention, accuracy, safeguards, openness, individual access, challenging
compliance. These principles represent a wellestablished consensus on what is necessary to
protect privacy in the contemporary social and
technological environment. The ten principles
are interrelated, make reference to one another
and should be read together. They do not have
to be enumerated distinctly and separately in
substantially similar legislation – what is important is that they all be represented. Special
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emphasis will be placed on the principles of
consent, access and correction rights.
— provide for an independent and effective oversight and redress mechanism with powers to
investigate . . .
— restrict the collection, use and disclosure of personal information to purposes that are appropriate or legitimate. The Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act
restricts organizations to the collection, use or
disclosure of personal information only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider
appropriate in the circumstances. . . . Such a provision is meant to ensure that an individual can
challenge illegitimate, unreasonable or inappropriate collections, uses, disclosures of their information. Substantially similar legislation will
include some reference to the reasonableness
and appropriateness of the purposes for which it
authorizes the collection, use or disclosure of
personal information. 31
PIPEDA applies at present in Ontario by default. As
was noted above, on November 1, 2004, the new
Ontario Act – PHIPA – came into force. However, until
this Act is deemed to be substantially similar to PIPEDA,
the latter will apply to all sectors of commercial activities
including those in the health sector. An announcement
that the new Ontario Act will be declared substantially
similar to PIPEDA has already been made. 32 Nevertheless, even after the Proposed Order becomes effective,
PIPEDA will continue to apply to commercial activities
in sectors other than health care and, as far as the health
care sector is concerned, to all commercial activities
relating to the exchange of personal health information
between provinces and territories and to information
transfers outside of Canada. 33
Before going on to discuss the interrelationship
between PIPEDA and PHIPA, I will briefly review the
development of personal information protection legislation in Canada and possible questions about the constitutional validity of PIPEDA.
Historically, Quebec was the first province to enact
a law covering issues of the protection of personal information in the private sector. 34 In November 2003,
Quebec’s private sector personal data protection law was
deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA by the federal
government and the whole province was exempted from
the application of the federal Act. 35 More recently, in
January 2004, general laws on personal data protection
in British Columbia 36 and Alberta 37 came into force. On
April 10, 2004, the federal government found the B.C.
and Alberta statutes to be substantially similar to the
federal statute. 38 In addition to developing general personal data protection legislation, provinces have been
also engaged in preparing sectoral laws. Thus, Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and Alberta have developed specific legislation for personal health information. 39

As PIPEDA in general, and its application to the
health care sector 40 in particular, ‘‘raises questions about
the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments in this field’’, 41 it was foreseeable that
the constitutional validity of the Act would be challenged. 42 PIPEDA is indeed being challenged now. On
December 17, 2003 (i.e., a month after the Exemption
Order 43 was issued), the Government of Quebec
obtained an order from the Quebec Court of Appeal
allowing it to proceed with a constitutional challenge to
PIPEDA. 44 The Quebec Court of Appeal will be asked to
answer the question whether PIPEDA is ultra vires the
federal government.
Quebec takes the position that ‘‘the very fact that
PIPEDA requires a provincial law to be excluded from
the purview of PIPEDA (if PIPEDA is not to apply within
a province) implies that the federal government has the
right to oversee the content of provincial legislation’’ on
the protection of personal information which is ‘‘incompatible with the foundations of Canadian federalism’’. 45
It is anticipated that other provinces may join Quebec in
this constitutional battle, and that, if the Quebec Court
of Appeal answers the question posed in the affirmative,
an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada will follow.
Hence, the constitutionality of PIPEDA may be an uncertain issue for several years. 46
Leaving a further detailed examination of the constitutionality of PIPEDA outside the scope of this article, I
will now turn back to Ontario’s PHIPA and its interrelationship with the federal Act. When the Proposed
Order 47 becomes effective, PIPEDA will not apply to
Ontario physicians’ and public hospitals’ intra-provincial
commercial dealings.
When the criteria set out by the federal government
for determining substantial similarity are applied to the
new Ontario piece of legislation, the latter clearly meets
the test to be exempted from PIPEDA. All of the 10 principles 48 are reflected in PHIPA: there are provisions on
consent, 49 accountability, 50 openness, 51 security, 52 and
accuracy, 53 as well as restrictions on the collection, use
and disclosure of personal health information. 54 The
requirement for the independent and effective mechanism of review, investigation and redress is also met, for
PHIPA contains detailed provisions on administration
and enforcement. 55 Further, ‘‘[i]t is not required that provincial laws are modeled precisely upon PIPEDA in
order to be considered substantially similar’’. 56 The federal Act ‘‘. . . affords provinces/territories the flexibility to
adopt and tailor their own private sector legislation to
the specific needs and conditions of their jurisdiction
while meeting the intent of [PIPEDA] . . . ’’ 57 The Act is
‘‘not trying to prescribe in detail what provinces need to
do . . .’’; rather, it sets ‘‘the general standard, and the
provinces can legislate around it’’. 58 Finally, it is possible
that even sectoral provincial legislation may meet the
‘‘substantially similar’’ test. 59 All these considerations
must have been taken into account when the federal
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government declared its intention to deem PHIPA substantially similar to PIPEDA. In addition, because of the
pending constitutional challenge, the federal government may have been more willing to find a compromise
with the province.
It should be noted, however, that there are some
differences between PHIPA and PIPEDA. In particular,
the provincial Act takes a more expansive approach to
cases of permitted disclosure of personal health information. Thus, according to section 46, a health information
custodian 60 shall, upon request of the Minister of Health
and Long-Term Care, disclose to the latter personal
health information about an individual for the purpose
of monitoring or verifying claims for payment for health
care funded wholly or in part by the Ministry. This information may, however, be disclosed by the Minister to
‘‘any person for a purpose set out’’ in subsection (1) only
‘‘if the disclosure is reasonably necessary for that purpose’’. 61
As well, under section 47, the Minister is entitled to
approve a health data institute and to request the custodian to disclose personal health information to that institute for analysis with respect to the management, evaluation or monitoring of the resources, their allocation or
planning for the health system. The rights of the Minister
under this provision are not, however, overreaching. First,
the Minister is required to submit the proposal to the
Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner before
requesting the disclosure so that the Commissioner can
review and comment on the proposal. 62 In reviewing the
proposal the Commissioner must take into consideration the public interest in conducting the analysis and
the privacy interests of the concerned individuals. 63 Any
comments made by the Commissioner must be considered by the Minister. 64 Second, a health data institute, to
be approved by the Minister for the purposes of the
disclosure, must possess certain qualities. In particular, it
must have in place practices and procedures approved by
the Commissioner to protect the privacy of the individuals whose personal health information it receives. 65
Third, the institute that receives personal health information must follow certain steps in dealing with this information. For example, the institute must de-identify 66 the
information in question; it can disclose the information
to the Minister or those approved by the Minister only in
a de-identified form; it cannot disclose the information
to persons other than the Minister or those approved by
the Minister even in a de-identified form. 67
To conclude on PHIPA’s provisions related to disclosure of personal health information, even though the
provincial Act provides for more situations when the
information can be disclosed, as was shown above, it
puts reasonable restrictions on disclosure. Hence, there is
no surprise that the expectations that the federal government exempt provincial health care providers from also
having to comply with PIPEDA 68 will soon be satisfied.
In the meantime, however, PIPEDA remains in effect,

and it is important to point out some of its implications
for physicians and public hospitals. 69

What is ‘‘Commercial Activity’’?
The next question to be explored is what ‘‘commercial activity’’ in PIPEDA is. ‘‘Commercial activity’’ has a
broad statutory definition under subsection 2(1) of the
federal Act:
any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular
course of conduct that is of a commercial character
including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor, membership or other fundraising lists.

Thus, the inquiry is not only about the nature of the
organization in question but also about the nature of the
one particular transaction. As a result, any not-for-profit
organizations, including public hospitals, may be caught
by this definition with respect to a certain transaction.
Accordingly, public hospitals ought to be cognizant of
whether any of their activities are likely to be considered
commercial within the meaning of the federal statute.
Depending on that, they may have to comply with the
requirements under PIPEDA.
It has been suggested that PIPEDA does not extend
to core activities of public hospitals. 70 As to what constitute ‘‘core activities’’, it has been commented that an
institution’s ‘‘core activities’’ are the activities defined
either in a provincial statute regulating that particular
industry or in the legal entity’s corporate constitution. 71
It follows then that core activities of public hospitals
include care and treatment. 72 In order to determine
what is covered by ‘‘care’’ and ‘‘treatment’’ as core public
hospital activities, provincial health care-related legislation and specialized medical dictionaries are of some
assistance. ‘‘Health care’’ means ‘‘any observation, examination, assessment, care, service or procedure that is done
for a health-related purpose’’ and that is carried out or
provided to diagnose, treat or maintain an individual’s
physical or mental condition, to prevent disease or injury
or to promote health, or as part of palliative care. 73
‘‘Care’’ may include ‘‘not only the traditional care of the
acutely or chronically ill patient, but also the prevention
and early detection of disease and the rehabilitation of
the disabled’’. 74 On the other hand, ‘‘treatment’’ means
‘‘anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palliative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related purpose’’. 75 It includes ‘‘the maintenance, observation, medical care and supervision and skilled nursing care of a
patient’’. 76 Generally ‘‘treatment’’ can be defined as medical or surgical management of a patient. 77
The federal government takes the position that
‘‘[t]he funding source (public health insurance, private
payer, third party payer, etc.) is not relevant in determining the existence of a commercial activity’’. 78 On this
view, the Act does not apply to the core activities of
public hospitals, not because they are provincially
funded but because they are ‘‘beyond the constitutional
scope of the Act as their core activities are not commer-
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cial in nature’’. 79 Therefore, charging for a private room,
for instance, would not make a public hospital subject to
PIPEDA, for such a transaction is part of the hospital’s
core activities (i.e., providing accommodation for care
and treatment). 80 On the other hand, certain limited
public hospital activities may be covered by PIPEDA. For
instance, while PIPEDA does not apply to public hospital
fundraising activities, such dealings as sales of donor lists
may be caught by the Act. 81
It can be argued that the conclusion that at least
core activities of public hospitals do not fall within the
scope of ‘‘commercial activities’’ under PIPEDA is supported by the rules of statutory interpretation. The rules
mandate courts to consider not only the ordinary
meaning of words, but also the context and the purpose
of the statute in question. 82 In particular, when PIPEDA
is read with a view to its context and purpose, the courts
should take into account the legislative history of the Act
and the original intent of its drafters. It is a fact of the
legislative history that the health care sector did not
participate in the drafting of the Model Code for the
Protection of Personal Information 83 containing the ten
principles now deemed by the Act as essential for the
protection of personal information and, thus, incorporated directly into the Act. 84 As a result, the Act was
prepared without specific consultation with the health
care sector. 85 Furthermore, developed in connection
with the federal government’s interest in trade and commerce, PIPEDA was not originally intended to be applicable to the health care sector. 86 The application to the
health care system appears to be an ‘‘incidental’’ or
‘‘ancillary’’ result of the legislative drafting. 87
Turning back to the definition of the term ‘‘commercial activity’’, it should be emphasized that its scope
in the context of PIPEDA will remain unclear until the
courts provide guidance through their decisions on the
application of PIPEDA. So far, there has not been any
case law directly relevant to the issue of the meaning of
the term in the context of PIPEDA. Given, however, the
courts’ willingness to read down the broad language in
PIPEDA, 88 it is reasonable to expect that the judiciary
will take a restrictive view on the interpretation of ‘‘commercial activity’’ as well. In Ferenczy v. MCI Medical
Clinics, 89 for instance, the Court held that although a
private investigator’s videotape contained personal information about the plaintiff collected without her consent
and thus, arguably, obtained and disclosed contrary to
PIPEDA, it was still admissible evidence at trial, for its
probative value outweighed its possible prejudicial
effects. The Court even went on to suggest that the
obtaining and the proposed use of the videotape at trial
did not breach PIPEDA at all. The Court employed the
concept of agency to find that the private investigator
was acting as an agent of the defendant physician and,
therefore, the Act did not apply in this situation because
the defendant was collecting the said personal information not in the course of commercial activities but for
the purpose of defending himself in a legal proceeding.
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This decision demonstrates that the courts may use
various interpretative techniques to restrict the application of PIPEDA to ‘‘the traditional areas of commerce,
focusing on direct contact between businesses and their
customers and potential customers’’. 90 It also suggests
that the courts will look at the purpose of the collection,
use or disclosure of personal information to determine
whether the information in question was collected, used
or disclosed in the course of commercial activities.
Further, the term ‘‘commercial activity’’ has been
interpreted by courts in the context of other legislation
(e.g., in the context of income tax and state immunity
laws). 91 Accordingly, it has been proposed to interpret
the term ‘‘commercial activity’’ in the context of PIPEDA
with the assistance of tests developed by case law, albeit
in a different setting. For example, health care sector
representatives have recommended the application of
the so-called ‘‘primary aim’’ or ‘‘preponderant purpose’’
test, which means that an organization’s activity is considered to be commercial so long as its primary purpose
is ‘‘making a pecuniary gain for the personal benefit of its
members, as opposed to recovering its costs or promoting its philanthropic, charitable, scientific, health or
other like object’’. 92 In Re Regional Assessment Commissioner and Caisse Populaire de Hearst Ltee., 93 the
Supreme Court of Canada adopted the ‘‘preponderant
purpose’’ test to determine whether an entity was carrying on a business and, thus, subject to a business tax.
The test is essentially based
. . . upon a consideration of whether the activity concerned
is carried on for the purpose of earning a profit or for some
other preponderant purpose. If the preponderant purpose
was other than to make a profit, then even if there were
other characteristics of the organization, including an intent
in some cases to make a profit . . . , it would not be classed as
a business. 94

Since ‘‘carrying on a business’’ and ‘‘being engaged
in a ‘commercial activity’’’ have a very close meaning, I
would argue that the ‘‘preponderant purpose’’ and ‘‘primary aim’’ tests are based on analogous considerations
and, thus, can be employed by the courts while interpreting the definition of ‘‘commercial activity’’ in
PIPEDA. The Court’s ‘‘purposeful’’ analysis in Ferenczy v.
MCI Medical Clinics seems to support this argument.
There is little doubt that PIPEDA covers private
labs, 95 private pharmacies, 96 and other for-profit private
health care facilities, 97 as their activities are clearly ‘‘commercial’’ 98 in nature. 99 It is not certain, however, to what
extent the Act applies to physicians. Due to the specificity of the structure of the Canadian health care system,
which is generally described as ‘‘publicly funded yet privately delivered,’’ 100 Canadian physicians are private forprofit contractors. 101 They enter into contracts ‘‘with provincial governments through their provincial medical
associations to supply publicly funded health services to
Canadians’’. 102
As was already noted above, the fact that the services
are publicly funded is not relevant in determining
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whether they can be treated as non-commercial. Indeed,
the same physician can deliver services both covered and
not covered by provincial health plans. For instance, a
dermatologist can perform on the same patient and at
the same time two operations: the removal of a carcinoma which is publicly funded and a cosmetic surgery
which is not publicly funded. 103 It is absurd in this situation to require a treatment record be in compliance with
two different regimes just because the operations
involved have different funding sources. It has been suggested, therefore, by commentators, 104 as well as by
health care sector representatives 105 that most physicians
fall under the jurisdiction of PIPEDA. Only physicians
‘‘employed by a government body or a non-profit agency
(e.g., a public hospital) that does not sell goods or services’’ 106 are thought to be exempt from the Act. The
majority of physicians – i.e., those who have private
offices and/or enjoy privileges at public hospitals and
other health care facilities 107 – would be expected to
comply with the personal information protection rules
set out in PIPEDA.
To conclude the discussion on the applicability of
PIPEDA, it appears the best view is that the Act does not
apply to the core activities of public hospitals and services delivered by physicians employed by the latter,
whereas physicians having private offices or privileges at
hospitals are engaged in commercial dealings that will be
subject to the Act. Recent case law lends support to
expectations that PIPEDA will be interpreted narrowly. If
provincial personal data protection legislation is deemed
to pass the ‘‘substantially similar’’ threshold, or PIPEDA is
declared inoperative due to its constitutional invalidity,
all public hospital activities and all types of physicians
(along with private health care facilities, labs, etc.) will in
consequence be free from application of this federal Act.
Unless PIPEDA becomes inapplicable, physicians (with
the exception of those employed by public hospitals) 108
will need to comply with it. A discussion of the requirements for compliance follows below.
Procedures Required under PIPEDA
First of all, physicians must have free and informed
consent from individuals to collect, use, and disclose
their personal health information. 109 ‘‘Personal health
information’’ is a defined term which means
information concerning the physical or mental health of the
individual; information concerning any health service provided to the individual; information concerning the donation by the individual of any body part or any bodily substance of the individual or information derived from the
testing or examination of a body part or bodily substance of
the individual; information that is collected in the course of
providing health services to the individual; or information
that is collected incidentally to the provision of health services to the individual. 110

For the purposes of the following discussion, personal health information will be treated as a subset of
personal information.
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Under section 7 of the Act, no personal information
can be collected, used or disclosed to third parties
without the knowledge or consent of the individual.
There are, however, some exceptions to this general principle. One of them, relates to use and disclosure without
knowledge or consent for the purposes of statistical, or
scholarly study or research, provided that: first, these purposes cannot be achieved without using or disclosing the
information; second, the information is used or disclosed
in a manner that will ensure its confidentiality; third, it is
impracticable to obtain consent; and fourth, the organization informs the Commissioner of the use or disclosure beforehand.
This exception may be relevant to physicians conducting health research in the course of their patients’
treatment. The scope of this exemption has yet to be
clarified. Nevertheless, it can be argued that if the court
agrees that ‘‘[a]ny bona fide health research, undertaken
by legitimate organizations 111 under appropriate safeguards, will . . . constitute ‘statistical or scholarly study or
research’ even if there is an element of pecuniary interest
involved’’, 112 physicians will not need patients’ consent
in order to use and disclose personal health information
for the purposes of health research. Consent will still be
necessary though for the collection of such information.
It should also be stressed that to be able to rely on the
scholarly research exception, physicians will have to
follow the conditions set out above.
Further on the issue of consent, the requirements in
Principle 4.3 of Schedule 1 to the Act must be met.
Patients must be advised of the purposes of collection,
use and disclosure of the information, taking into
account the patients’ reasonable expectations.
In addition to the procedures related to the issue of
consent, doctors, as organizations 113 responsible for personal information under their control, must put in place
other procedures so that the rest of the principles in
Schedule 1, such as accountability, identified purposes,
limited collection, use, disclosure, and retention, accuracy, security, and openness, are complied with.
Doctors must also ensure that patients have access
to their personal health information. Access can be
denied in limited circumstances: if doing so would likely
reveal personal information about a third party, if the
information is protected by the solicitor–client privilege,
if to give access would reveal confidential commercial
information or could reasonably give rise to threatening
the life or security of other individuals. 114 If however, the
information can be severed, access must be given after
severing.
To help physicians cope with the new situation, the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario has provided health practitioners with some guidance as to
what practical measures must be implemented in order
to safeguard personal health information in the manner
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prescribed by the federal law. For example, it has been
suggested that doctors implement
physical measures (e.g., restricted access areas, locked filing
cabinets), organizational measures (e.g., need-to-know and
other employee policies, security clearances), and technological measures (e.g., passwords, encryption, virus protection,
firewalls). 115

There are also recommendations with regard to the
location and transfer of paper and electronic information, education of staff, review of agreements with consultants and contractors, and so forth. 116
If the provisions of PIPEDA imposing obligations to
protect personal information are contravened, an
affected individual may file a complaint with the office
of the federal Privacy Commissioner. 117 If there are reasonable grounds to investigate the matter, the complaint
may be initiated by the Commissioner. 118 In respect of
all complaints, whether filed by individuals or initiated
by the Commissioner, proper investigations must be
conducted. 119 Unless the Commissioner is satisfied that
it is more reasonable or appropriate that the complaint is
dealt with by other means, she must issue a report containing findings, recommendations or requests to the
organization whose practices have been under investigation. 120 After receiving the Commissioner’s report, the
complainant, if not satisfied with the result, may further
apply to the court 121 which, in addition to any other
remedies available in law generally, may order the organization to correct its practices, as well as award damages
to the complainant, including damages for any humiliation suffered. 122
Having outlined the main obligations imposed on
physicians by PIPEDA, I will continue my analysis by
looking at the new Ontario legislation and its possible
effects.

Impact of PHIPA
PHIPA is an example of sectoral provincial personal
data protection legislation. As was noted above, apart
from Ontario, there are three other provinces – Alberta,
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan – which have enacted statutes related to the protection of personal health information. None of these Acts has been declared to be substantially similar to PIPEDA. However, all three statutes –
Alberta’s Health Information Act, 123 Manitoba’s Personal
Health Information Act, 124 and Saskatchewan’s Health
Information Protection Act 125 – ‘‘have been variously
described as having very little to do with privacy and
much more concerned with providing government and
researcher access to confidential medical records’’. 126
PHIPA, on the other hand, is clearly an Act designed to
enhance protection of patient privacy and due to this the
federal government has already announced that the new
Ontario law will be deemed to be substantially similar to
PIPEDA in the nearest future. 127

Application
According to section 7 of PHIPA, the statute applies
to:
(1) the collection of personal health information by
a health information custodian;
(2) the use or disclosure of personal health information by a health information custodian or any
other person, to whom the information has
been disclosed by the custodian;
(3) the collection, use or disclosure of a health
number by any person.
Thus, as far as personal health information is concerned, PHIPA is intended to apply primarily to health
information custodians in the course of collection, use
and disclosure of such information. PHIPA also has a
very limited application to non-custodians when the
latter use or disclose personal health information disclosed to them by health information custodians. The
new legislation applies to the use and disclosure of the
personal health information even if collected before
enactment. 128 Further, the new Act applies to any personal health information collected, used or disclosed by
a health information custodian, or used or disclosed by
any other person, regardless of whether the custodian or
the person in question is engaged in commercial activities.
The term ‘‘health information custodians’’ refers to
persons who have custody or control of personal health
information as a result of or in connection with their
work, powers or duties, and includes a variety of individuals and organizations from health care practitioners to
all types of hospitals. 129 Clearly, physicians and public
hospitals, which have been the focus of this article, are
covered by the definition of health information custodians.
A full and free exchange of information between
health care practitioners, particularly physicians, and
patients is a prerequisite for the provision of adequate
care and treatment. It will be impossible to either diagnose or treat ‘‘if the physician does not have all the
necessary information’’ about the patient. 130 Most of this
information is personal. Every time the patient goes to
see her doctor, the doctor collects patient’s personal
health information (e.g., symptoms, family predispositions to certain illness, habits, etc.). The information collected invariably needs to be used and disclosed in order
to provide the patient with adequate therapeutic relief
(e.g., referrals to specialists or specific procedures such as
blood tests, ultrasound, X-rays, etc.). Hence, virtually all
health care-related activities are covered by PHIPA, and it
is critically important for all physicians and public hospitals to be aware of the new Ontario Act’s implications.
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Procedures Established by PHIPA

Administrative Obligations
Part II of the Act 131 imposes certain duties on health
information custodians. First, there are a number of
administrative requirements. Each health information
custodian must have in place information practices, i.e.,
policies in relation to the collection, use and disclosure
of personal health information, which include the
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards. 132
There are special rules on the handling of records. 133
Health information custodians must appoint an information officer, called ‘‘contact person’’, who is required
to act as the custodian’s agent to facilitate compliance
with PHIPA and communicate with the public. 134 The
custodians must also describe their information practices
in a publicly available statement. 135 This statement must
outline how to reach contact persons, obtain access to or
request corrections of individual’s records, and make
complaints. Each health information custodian must
take steps to ensure accuracy 136 and security 137 of personal health information. Generally, if personal health
information is stolen, lost, or accessed by unauthorized
persons, a health information custodian must notify an
affected individual at the first reasonable opportunity. 138
Consent Provisions
Further, PHIPA contains detailed provisions on consent and capacity to give consent to the collection, use or
disclosure of personal health information. 139 Echoing
PIPEDA, PHIPA provides that consent must be voluntary
and knowledgeable. However, unlike PIPEDA, PHIPA
establishes ‘‘more workable consent procedures for the
collection, use and disclosure of personal health information’’. 140 For instance, consent under PHIPA is ‘‘knowledgeable’’ if it is reasonable to believe that a person
giving consent knows the purposes of the collection, use
or disclosure of personal health information and that
consent may be given and withheld. 141 Unless it is not
reasonable in the circumstances, it is presumed that the
person knows the purposes of the collection, use or disclosure of personal health information if the custodian
posts or makes readily available a notice describing the
purposes where it is likely to come to the person’s attention or provides the person with such a notice. 142
Consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health information about an individual may be
express or implied. 143 Consent to disclosure must be
express in only two situations: first, when a health information custodian makes a disclosure to a person who is
not a health information custodian and, second, when
one health information custodian makes a disclosure to
another health information custodian for purposes other
than providing health care. 144 It follows then that in
general terms, implied consent will be sufficient. To
demonstrate implied consent, public hospitals and physicians can use ‘‘[a] poster or brochure readily available and
likely to be seen by a patient’’. 145
The legislation has been praised for the fact that not
only can physicians assume implied consent for disclosure of personal health information to other health care
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practitioners treating the patient, but they can also
assume that a signed consent form relating to personal
health information is valid. 146 However, consent can no
longer be assumed to be ‘‘implied’’ if the custodian
receiving the information is aware that the individual
has expressly withheld or withdrawn the consent. 147 The
fact that ‘‘the rules for substituted consent for information handling are very similar to those for substituted
consent for treatment’’ 148 has been noted as being
among the positive effects of PHIPA as well.

Permitted Disclosure
The new Ontario Act sets out special rules for situations when health information custodians are permitted
to collect, use or disclose personal health information
without individuals’ consent. These rules mainly correspond with analogous provisions in PIPEDA. As far as
permitted disclosure is concerned, both PIPEDA and
PHIPA provide, for instance, that information can be
disclosed without knowledge or consent of the individual if it is prescribed, permitted or required by law. 149
Another example is the disclosure of personal health
information to a researcher for the purpose of research,
provided that certain conditions are met. 150 Generally,
the imposed conditions are considered to be met if a
Research Ethics Board has approved the researcher’s
research plan and the custodian and researcher have
entered into an agreement before the disclosure of personal health information in which the researcher agrees
to comply with the statutory requirements on the use,
security and disposal of the information in question. 151
‘‘Research’’ is defined in PHIPA as ‘‘a systematic investigation designed to develop or establish principles, facts
or generalizable knowledge, or any combination of
them, and includes the development, testing and evaluation of research’’. 152 This exception appears to be similar
to the scholarly research exception under PIPEDA.
However, the provincial Act goes beyond the federal
Act in that PHIPA, as was mentioned under the ‘‘‘Substantially Similar’ Test’’ section of this article, provides for
more situations when personal health information is permitted to be disclosed without the patient’s consent.
Thus, health information custodians are permitted to
disclose the information to prescribed persons for purposes related to providing health care 153 and to eliminating or reducing risks of serious bodily harm; 154 for
health or other programs 155 and for proceedings in
which custodians or their agents are parties or witnesses; 156 for monitoring health care payments 157 and
allowing potential successors to evaluate operations of
custodians, 158 and for the analysis 159, planning and management of the health care system. 160 In all of these
situations, the Act appears to put reasonable restrictions
on disclosure so as to ensure that personal health information is not disclosed for inappropriate, unreasonable
or illegitimate purposes.
Access
PHIPA gives patients a general right of access to
records containing their personal health information in
the custody and control of a health information custo-
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dian. 161 In certain cases, access can be denied. One such
case is when granting of the access can reasonably be
expected to result in a risk of serious harm to the
patient’s treatment or recovery. 162 Such an exception to
the general right of access to one’s personal information
is not provided for in PIPEDA.
Generally, health information custodians have thirty
days to process a request. 163 In certain situations, this
time period may be extended 164 or reduced. 165 If a health
information custodian refuses or is deemed to refuse
access, the individual has a right to make a complaint to
the Commissioner. 166 Finally, custodians may charge
individuals fees for access. 167 The amount of the fee is,
however, limited to the prescribed amount or the
amount of reasonable cost recovery, if no amount is
prescribed. 168

Enforcement and Remedies
Part VI of the new Act outlines consequences of
non-compliance with the requirements. They include
complaints to the Commissioner, 169 reviews, 170 and
inspections. 171 The Commissioner under PHIPA is the
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
appointed in accordance with the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. 172 PHIPA enumerates
powers of the Commissioner in relation to the protection of personal health information. 173 Generally, the
Commissioner has powers to review complaints about
contravention of PHIPA or initiate her own reviews and
to make orders as a result of such reviews. Upon
receiving the Commissioner’s order, an affected individual may appeal the order to the Divisional Court on a
question of law. 174 When the order becomes final as a
result of there being no further right of appeal, the
affected individual may commence a proceeding in the
Superior Court of Justice for damages for breach of privacy and mental anguish. 175
Lastly, PHIPA provides for fines imposed on health
information custodians and non-custodians, when the
latter are within the reach of PHIPA, for contraventions
of the Act. 176 Natural persons are liable, on conviction, to
a fine of up to $50,000, and organizations and corporations are liable, on conviction, to a fine of up to
$250,000. 177
To conclude on procedures under PHIPA, the obligations imposed by the new Ontario Act largely
resemble those imposed by PIPEDA. Consequently,
‘‘most physicians who have developed privacy policies to
comply with PIPEDA will only have to make minor
adjustments to them as a result of PHIPA’’. 178 A close
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examination of PHIPA reveals, however, that the discharge of the obligations under the new Ontario law
aligns more with the needs and traditions of the medical
profession than under PIPEDA. Most significantly,
PHIPA provides for more workable provisions on consent. Thus, it can be argued that the new Ontario Act
suits interests of the health care sector better and, therefore, should supercede the federal Act.

Conclusions

O

bligations created under PIPEDA and PHIPA not
only codify rules found in common law, but also
go beyond that and introduce new concepts instigated
by new technological developments.
Until the new Ontario Act is deemed to be substantially similar to PIPEDA, and as long as PIPEDA is not
found to be constitutionally invalid, this federal Act
applies in the provincial health care sector. While core
activities of public hospitals are not covered by the definition of ‘‘commercial activity’’ in PIPEDA, activities performed by physicians in their private offices or in hospitals where they have privileges are commercial in nature
and, thus, subject to PIPEDA. Physicians, with the exception of those employed by public hospitals, and, in
extremely rare situations, public hospitals when engaged
in other than core activities such as care and treatment,
must comply with the obligations under PIPEDA.
As PHIPA applies to the whole health care sector, all
health care practitioners, including physicians, and
health care facilities and public hospitals need to follow
rules established by the new Ontario Act. Due to the fact
that the new Ontario Act meets all the criteria set out by
Industry Canada, the federal government have already
declared that PHIPA will be deemed substantially similar
to PIPEDA. When the Proposed Order becomes effective, physicians and public hospitals in Ontario will be
exempt from the reach of PIPEDA and, thus, will need to
comply only with the requirements established by the
provincial Act. In the meantime, compliance with both
pieces of legislation is required.
Generally, obligations under PHIPA are similar to
those under PIPEDA. The difference between the two
Acts, in the author’s opinion, is that PHIPA better meets
the needs of the health care sector in Ontario, as it is
tailored specifically for that purpose. The most significant advantage of PHIPA is that it provides for more
workable provisions on consent.
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